The target article by Christopher Meyers concerning justification of deception for clinical ethicists is both well-reasoned and plausible. Clearly grounded in utilitarian considerations, its...

To mitigate animal suffering under industrial farming conditions, biotechnology companies are pursuing the development of genetically disenhanced animals. Recent advances in gene editing biotechnology have brought this to reality. In one of the first discussions of the ethics of disenhancement, Thompson argued that it is hard to find compelling reasons to oppose it. We offer an argument against disenhancement that draws upon parallels with human disenhancement, ecofeminism’s concern with the “logic of domination,” and a relational ethic that seeks to preserve (...) a meaningful relationship between farmers and their animals. In addition, we respond to two arguments in favor of animal disenhancement—one grounded in the non-identity problem and one that argues disenhancement is the best we can do to protect animal well-being right now. We argue that animal disenhancement does not address the fundamental issue of oppression of animals in the context of contemporary animal agriculture. Therefore, we conclude that animal disenhancement is not nearly as valuable as it might appear initially. (shrink)

In a town near mine, a small business owner used their changeable-letter sign to wage a public protest against a variety of restrictions implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. Unlike a great man...

Philosophical reflections on the environment began with early philosophers' invocation of a cosmology that mixed natural and supernatural phenomena. Today, the central philosophical problem posed by the environment involves not what it can teach us about ourselves and our place in the cosmic order but rather how we can understand its workings in order to make better decisions about our own conduct regarding it. The resulting inquiry spans different areas of contemporary philosophy, many of which are represented by the fifteen (...) original essays in this volume. The contributors first consider conceptual problems generated by rapid advances in biology and ecology, examining such topics as ecological communities, adaptation, and scientific consensus. The contributors then turn to epistemic and axiological issues, first considering philosophical aspects of environmental decision making and then assessing particular environmental policies, including reparations, remediation, and nuclear power, from a normative perspective. (shrink)

The concept of equipoise is considered by many to be part of the ethical justification for using human subjects in clinical research. In general, equipoise indicates some uncertainty about the relative merits of the experimental intervention compared to existing treatments. Relieving this uncertainty gives scientific value to an experiment, thereby making the risks to human subjects in the trial acceptable, other considerations notwithstanding. But characterizing equipoise remains controversial since Freedman’s groundbreaking publication on the subject. We offer a new account of (...) equipoise that draws on and extends an option Freedman discarded. After establishing the importance of some account of equipoise as part of ethically justified clinical trials, we revisit Freedman’s distinction between clinical and theoretical equipoise. We raise concerns about Freedman’s preferred clinical equipoise and then rehabilitate theoretical equipoise. In particular, we use a variety of arguments from epistemology to show how Freedman was too hasty in rejecting theoretical equipoise. In addition, we argue that theoretical equipoise is a subspecies of epistemic equipoise, which we characterize as a form of uncertainty that is the result of the possibility of error. This type of uncertainty can best be alleviated by research, which produces beliefs supported by strong statistical evidence, which is a key aim of clinical trials. Further, this type of uncertainty can explain why even clinicians with more firsthand experience with an intervention than their peers, and who may not be in theoretical equipoise, could still justifiably support a trial designed to ameliorate the possibility of error due to cognitive bias. (shrink)